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The value of U.S. dairy exports and imports were both at record levels in 2005. U.S. exports of nonfat dry milk 
were up 20 percent in volume and 25 percent in value, and accounted for more than a third of dairy export value. 
Exports of whey products (including lactose), up more than 40 percent in volume and 16 percent in value, added 
another 20 percent. U.S. dairy imports were up $260 million, with cheese imports breaking the $1 billion mark for 
the ﬁrst time despite lower tonnage. The U.S. dairy trade deﬁcit was more than $1 billion in 2005.
U.S. dairy trade prospects in 2006 are not as bright as last year, mainly because there will be less U.S. nonfat 
dry milk to sell. However, world dairy prices are expected to stay strong by historical standards because of limited 
gains in milk production in the EU and Oceania and solid growth in consumption.
Trade in the longer run will be inﬂuenced by ongoing negotiations under the Doha Round of the WTO. Unfor-
tunately, negotiations relating to market access and domestic support for agricultural commodities appear to be 
deadlocked. Deadlines for culmination of an agreement are rapidly approaching, and prospects for reaching an 
agreement prior to expiration of U.S. “fast track” authority are becoming dimmer.
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2  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2006-1Led by the second consecutive year of exceptionally 
large nonfat dry milk shipments, U.S. dairy exports 
totaled a record $1.6 billion in 2005, eclipsing last 
yearʼs record export value by $160 million. However, 
an even larger gain in imports widened the U.S. dairy 
trade gap to more than $1 billion, also a new record 
(Figure 1). Imports of cheese exceeded $1 billion for 
the  ﬁrst  time  in  2005,  and  casein  imports  were  up 
nearly $100 million from 2004.
U.S. Dairy Exports
Nonfat dry milk (called skim milk powder, or SMP 
outside the U.S.) accounted for more than a third of 
the value of U.S. dairy exports in 2005 (Figure 2). 
SMP export value was up 25 percent from 2004 on 
both higher volume and higher prices. 
The U.S. was in the enviable position of being the 
only major SMP exporter with sufﬁcient stocks to sup-
ply a tight world market in 2005. Surplus U.S. gov-
ernment stocks were practically eliminated, and U.S. 
SMP prices remained well above the government sup-
port level all year. This had a signiﬁcant impact on 
producer milk prices in the U.S. Strong SMP markets 
caused milk to be diverted from cheese vats to dryers, 
holding cheese prices higher than expected earlier in 
the year.
Whey  exports  were  also  strong,  up  19.5  percent 
over 2004 and contributing 14 percent of total export 
value. Whey powder and whey protein concentrates 
U.S. DAIRY TRADE SITUATION AND OUTLOOK, 2006
Edward V. Jesse and William D. Dobson
2  Dairy trade data presented and summarized in this report are from the Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA, U.S. Trade Internet System 
(http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade/). Total dairy import value and volume reported here conform to Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United 
States (FATUS) reports. However, we deﬁne dairy exports to exclude casein glues, rennet and foreign donations. This results in slightly 
smaller total dairy exports than shown in FATUS reports.
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were in high demand by some countries as a substi-
tute for more costly sources of milk protein. Lactose, a 
whey derivative, showed a 9 percent export value gain 
over last year (Table 1).
The U.S. produces an increasing volume of whey 
products for two reasons: cheese production is expand-
ing rapidly and more of the whey produced in cheese-
making is being utilized. According to the U.S. Dairy 
Export Council (as quoted in [2]), U.S. whey produc-
tion exceeds domestic needs by 50 percent, making 
export markets extremely important. A one-cent per 
pound change in dry whey prices changes federal milk 
TABLE 1.  Value of U.S. Dairy Exports, 2004 and 2005
  2004  2005                              Change 
Product   $1,000   $1,000  $1,000  Percent
Fresh Milk & Cream  22,854  15,835  –7,019  –30.7%
MPC  10,611  32,955  22,344  210.6%
Whey Products  186,811  223,231  36,420  19.5%
Nonfat Dry Milk  445,603  556,556  110,953  24.9%
Other Milk Powders  76,027  21,565  –54,462  –71.6%
Condensed/Evaporated  32,887  18,449  –14,438  –43.9%
Butter/Butterfat  15,214  16,829  1,615  10.6%
All Cheese  197,511  201,076  3,565  1.8%
Yogurt  5,406  7,641  2,235  41.3%
Other Cultured/Fermented  3,583  8,331  4,748  132.5%
Lactose  105,590  115,049  9,459  9.0%
Infant Form.  87,036  76,802  –10,234  –11.8%
Misc. Food Preparations  172,256  208,030  35,774  20.8%
Ice Cream/Frozen Desserts  53,423  62,367  8,944  16.7%
Milk-Based Drinks  19,081  13,656  –5,425  –28.4%
Casein  5,427  6,237  810  14.9%
Caseinates  13,369  23,765  10,396  77.8%
Total, All Products  1,452,689  1,608,374  155,685  10.7%
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marketing order Class III prices by six cents per hun-
dredweight.
Together, SMP and whey account for an increasing 
share of U.S. dairy export value, from 31 percent in 
1996 to 56 percent in 2005 (Figure 3). Whey export 
value  has  been  relatively  stable  from  year  to  year, 
with much of the variation in value due to variation in 
prices. Nonfat dry milk exports are much more vola-
tile, with the last two years value more than triple the 
1996–2003 average.
In 2005, the value of dairy-based food preparations 
moved ahead of cheese in the U.S. dairy export proﬁle. 
Exports of food preparations were up 21 percent from 
last year, while cheese exports were up only slightly in 
value and down 6 percent in volume.
The  U.S.  exported  dairy  products  to  144  coun-
tries in 2005. Two countries—Mexico and Canada—
accounted for nearly half of total export value (Figure 
4). Several Southeast Asian countries, and Japan and 
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China in East Asia took another 31 percent of U.S. 
dairy exports.
Export growth has been strongest in Southeast Asia, 
notably Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. China has 
also become a major customer for U.S. dairy products, 
especially whey, while exports to Japan have shown a 
slight decrease in value over the last 10 years.
In 2005, more than 40 percent of U.S. SMP exports 
went to Mexico (Figure 5). Another 30 percent was 
imported  by  ﬁve  Southeast Asian  countries.  Cuba, 
which reported no SMP imports from the U.S. prior 
to 2004, has become a signiﬁcant market, taking more 
than  5  percent  of  our  SMP  exports  in  the  last  two 
years.
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Mexico was also the leading market for U.S. whey 
exports in 2005 (Figure 6). Canada, China, and Japan 
rounded out the top four destinations for whey. None 
of the latter three countries were major importers of 
U.S. nonfat dry milk.
Four countries consistently account for most U.S. 
cheese exports—Mexico, Canada, Japan and Korea. 
Among these countries, cheese exports to Mexico have 
grown the fastest, especially since 1999 (Figure 7).
U.S. Dairy Imports
The value of U.S. dairy imports increased by $260 
million in 2005 (Table 2). The largest absolute gain 
was for casein (+ $96 million). Other big gainers were 
miscellaneous food preparations (+ $71 million), and 
cheese and milk protein concentrate (MPC), both up 
$25 million.
As  usual,  cheese  was  the  leading  dairy  product 
import by value in 2005 (Figure 8), but cheeseʼs share 
of total import value (37.5 percent) was down slightly 
from the average for 1996–2004 (43.4 percent). The 
erosion  in  import  market  share  for  cheese  in  2005 
came from larger percentage gains in imports of MPC 
and casein, and a large increase in dairy-based food 
preparations, mainly from Canada.
The U.S. imported dairy products from 92 countries 
in 2005. The 25 European Union countries accounted 
for 40 percent of our dairy imports, New Zealand and 
Australia, 26 percent, and Canada and Mexico, 18.5 
percent (Figure 9). All other regions combined made 
up the remaining 15 percent of total import value.
Europe was the source of more than three-quarters of 
U.S cheese imports in 2005 (Table 3). Italy accounted 
for 22 percent of the total. France was a distant second 
TABLE 2.  Value of U.S. Dairy Imports, 2004 and 2005
  2004  2005            Change 
Product  $1,000  $1,000  $1,000  Percent
Fresh Milk & Cream  8,463  14,267  5,804  69%
MPC  184,033  208,795  24,762  13%
Whey Products  59,904  66,089  6,185  10%
SMP  1,867  3,390  1,523  82%
WMP  18,313  33,050  14,737  80%
Cond./Evaporated  21,153  30,137  8,984  42%
Butter/Butterfat  91,122  89,984  –1,138  –1%
Cheese-All  981,753 1,006,974  25,221  3%
Yogurt  9,927  14,337  4,410  44%
Other Cult./Ferm.  1,446  1,890  444  31%
Lactose  5,562  5,084  –478  –9%
Infant Form.  3,488  3,205  –283  –8%
Misc. Food Preps.  501,274  572,021  70,747  14%
Ice Cream/Frozen  38,301  45,511  7,210  19%
Milk-Based Drinks  1,278  2,770  1,492  117%
Casein  321,044  416,774  95,730  30%
Caseinates  175,467  172,229  –3,238  –2%
TOTAL  2,424,395 2,686,507 262,112  11%
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with 12 percent. New Zealand and Australia together 
accounted for about 12 percent of U.S. cheese imports. 
Europe and Oceania supplied more than 90 percent of 
U.S. cheese import value in 2005.
Cheese  imported  from  Europe  is  generally  more 
costly than cheese sourced from other countries. In 
2005, cheese imported from Spain, Cyprus, Switzer-
land, Greece, Italy and France had a unit value of more 
than $3 per pound. Imports from New Zealand (which 
typically supplies the largest volume of U.S. cheese 
imports) were priced at $1.30 per pound in 2005.
Concentrated milk protein imports (MPC, casein, 
and  caseinates)  are  supplied  mainly  from  Oceania 
and Europe, with some differences in major countries 
among the three products. Oceania supplied 41 per-
cent of the import value of caseins in 2005 and Ire-
TABLE 3.  Source of U.S. Cheese Imports, 2005
Regional   Value   % of   Principal   Value   % of  
Grouping  ($1,000)  Total  Countries  ($1,000)  Total
EU-25  664,617  66.0%  Italy  220,325  21.9%
      France  123,581  12.3%
      Denmark  67,413  6.7%
      Netherlands  59,591  5.9%
      Finland  40,862  4.1%
      UK  33,598  3.3%
      Ireland  27,255  2.7%
      Spain  25,848  2.6%
      Germany  23,134  2.3%
Other Europe  97,639  9.7%  Switzerland  47,153  4.7%
      Norway  36,683  3.6%
Oceania  125,039  12.4%  New Zealand  76,214  7.6%
      Australia  48,822  4.8%
South America  76,261  7.6%  Argentina  50,961  5.1%
North America  27,783  2.8%  Canada  21,081  2.1%
All Other Regions  15,633  1.6%
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land and France supplied another 40 percent (Table 4). 
India occupied third place among countries supplying 
casein, nearly doubling its casein shipments to the U.S. 
from 2004.
New Zealand was the largest source of imports of 
caseinates for the U.S. in 2005, accounting for nearly 
40 percent of import value. Australia was not a fac-
tor in caseinates. Five EU-25 countries supplied about 
half of U.S. caseinate import value.
Three-quarters of the value of MPC imports to the 
U.S. came from New Zealand (Figure 10). New Zea-
land has become the dominant supplier of MPC to 
the U.S., nearly doubling its value of shipments since 
2000.
Summary of 2005 U.S. Dairy Trade
In 2005, the U.S. enjoyed a huge trade surplus in 
SMP (Figure 11), and larger trade surpluses than last 
year in whey products and lactose (both byproducts of 
cheese making). Trade deﬁcits in cheese, casein, and 
dairy-based food products increased, expanding the 
overall dairy trade deﬁcit by about $160 million, to 
about –$1.1 billion.
U.S.  dairy  trade  in  2005  was  heavily  inﬂuenced 
by  milk  supply  conditions  in  the  major  exporting 
countries—Oceania and the EU. New Zealand milk 
production,  which  has  recently  shown  large  year-
over-year  gains,  was  down  4  percent  for  the  New 
Zealand marketing year ending May 31. As a result, 
dairy exports from New Zealand—the largest export-
ing country—were off 12 percent for the 2004–2005 
marketing year [7]. Australian milk production was up 
slightly (0.5 percent), but remained 10 percent below 
the pre-drought record level in 2002 [1]. With a short 
milk supply, Oceania tends to divert the reduced vol-
ume into higher-valued export products, particularly 
MPC and cheese.
EU-25 milk production was up less than 1 percent 
in 2005, but much of the increase went to meet the 
TABLE 4.  Source of U.S. Imports of Casein and Caseinates
  Casein  Caseinates 
Country  Value ($1,000)  % of Total  Country  Value ($1,000) % of Total
Ireland  142,438  34.2%  New Zealand  64,987  37.7%
New Zealand  139,666  33.5%  Netherlands  35,871  20.8%
India  52,955  12.7%  Poland  18,785  10.9%
Australia  32,187  7.7%  Germany  18,235  10.6%
France  26,060  6.3%  France  16,572  9.6%
Ukraine  7,820  1.9%  Denmark  6,297  3.7%
China  5,930  1.4%  India  4,593  2.7%
Ukraine  5,566  1.3%  Ukraine  2,128  1.2%
Other  4152  1.0%  Other  4,761  2.8%
Total  416,774  100.0%  Total  172,229  100.0%







India 4,407 Other 5,356
Value of imports in $1,000;  
Total value = $209 millionU.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook, 2006
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Oceania; range midpoint of bi-weekly 
Dairy Market News quote.
FIGURE 11.  U.S. Dairy Trade Balance by Product, 2005
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growing domestic demand for cheese. Cheese produc-
tion was up 1.3 percent in the EU-25, but production 
of butter and SMP were down, and WMP production 
was at year-earlier levels.
Combined with very low world stocks of SMP at 
the end of 2004, the 2005 world milk supply situation 
caused a tight market for SMP. World exports were 
down about 8 percent, and prices were very attractive 
all year [6]. 
In the U.S., milk production grew by 3.5 percent in 
2005 and government stocks of SMP were more than 
400 million pounds at the start of the year. In response 
to strong world SMP prices (Figure 12), much of the 
added milk in the U.S. was funneled into SMP—annual 
production was 10 percent greater than 2004—which, 
when added to stocks, left a large exportable supply.
Outlook for U.S. Dairy Trade in 2006
World  milk  production  in  2006  is  expected  to 
increase by about 3 percent [6]. The production gain 
in the U.S. will be about the same as the world aver-
age, with milk cows up 1 percent and milk per cow 
up nearly 2 percent. In the EU-25, intervention prices 
for butter and SMP will fall, but an expansion of quota 
will likely prompt a gain in milk production of about 
0.5 percent [4]. The added milk will be absorbed by 
cheese  makers  serving  primarily  domestic  consum-
ers. Oceania milk production will be ﬂat, as more milk 
from Australia will be offset by smaller plant deliver-
ies in New Zealand due to poor weather in the early 
part of New Zealandʼs production season [7].
China will come close to matching 2005ʼs milk pro-
duction increase of 24 percent in 2006. The additional 
6–7 million metric tons of milk will all be consumed in 
China, and could dampen Chinese dairy imports, espe-
cially SMP. Brazil and Argentina are both expected to 
increase milk production in 2006 by 5 percent, sug-
gesting increased exports of whole milk powder and 
cheese from these countries [6]. Argentina milk pro-
duction has returned to the levels reached in 1999, 
before Argentine economic woes caused production to 
plummet.
Economic growth in both developed and develop-
ing countries is expected to be strong in 2006—around 
a 3 percent world-wide increase in GDP. This will help 
promote dairy consumption and imports [6]. However, 
continued  uncertainty  about  oil  prices  raises  some 
questions  about  the  possible  “closing  out”  of  dairy 
purchases due to higher energy bills. 
Among bulk dairy commodities, USDAʼs Foreign 
Agricultural Service is forecasting world trade to be 
up for cheese (+4.5 percent), butter (+2.4 percent) and 
WMP (+6.6 percent), but SMP trade is expected to be 
off by 5 percent, with U.S. SMP exports down 17 per-
cent [6].
The anticipated large reduction in U.S. SMP exports 
is related to availability. While the U.S. is expected to 
expand SMP production by 40,000 MT in 2006, stocks 
are only 126,000 MT, 172,000 MT less than was avail-
able at the end of 2004. Put simply, there is not enough 
product  to  meet  2005ʼs  SMP  export  volume  unless 
SMP production grows much more than expected. And 
that is unlikely given the anticipated heavy draw on 
the U.S. milk supply from new large western cheese 
plants.
U.S. exports of other dairy products in 2006 will be 
at or above 2005 levels. Whey and lactose exports will 
be higher, as will exports of dairy-based food ingredi-
ents. U.S. exports of infant formula will likely recover 
from last yearʼs fall-off.
World prices for bulk dairy commodities (butter, 
cheese, SMP and WMP) will soften during 2006, but 
moderate global milk production gains will keep prices 
from plummeting. So measured by value, U.S. dairy 
exports should not fall to less than $1.5 billion.
On the import side, cheese imports will continue to 
rise as wealthier U.S. consumers demand larger vol-
umes of exotic cheeses not produced in the United 
States. Imports of casein and other concentrated milk 
proteins will depend, in part, on domestic prices for 
SMP. But functionality considerations suggest larger 
MPC  imports  if  supplies  are  available  at  competi-
tive prices. Expect U.S. dairy imports to increase by 
another $200 million in 2006, which will further widen 
our dairy trade gap.
A big unknown on both the dairy export and import 
side is whether a new multilateral trade agreement will 
be put in place in 2006. We now turn to a discussion of 
that issue.U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook, 2006
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The  Doha  Round  of  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO) negotiations, which began in 2001, has had 
a rocky history. Since last yearʼs installment of the 
Babcock Instituteʼs “U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and 
Outlook,” there has been only limited progress in agri-
cultural trade reform. As reported in the 2005 report, 
a framework for modalities was completed by WTO 
negotiators in July 2004. This framework provided the 
format, but not the speciﬁcs, for eliminating agricul-
tural export subsidies, increasing market access, and 
reducing the amount that government farm programs 
distort trade in agricultural products. 
The  framework  for  modalities  was  structured  to 
provide a basis for additional agricultural trade reform 
negotiations  before  talks  began  at  the  Hong  Kong, 
China Ministerial meetings in December 2005. 
Prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial, the U.S. tabled 
an ambitious two-step proposal that would have even-
tually eliminated agricultural trade barriers. Under the 
U.S. proposal, certain trade-distorting support mea-
sures, tariffs and export subsidies would be eliminated 
over a ﬁve-year phase-in period. There then would 
be a ﬁve-year interlude, followed by a second stage 
of reductions, during which all tariffs and all trade- 
distorting support would be eliminated over another 
ﬁve-year period. The Group of 20 nations (led by Bra-
zil) also advanced a proposal that would have produced 
substantial agricultural trade reform. The EU put forth 
a proposal that represented relatively little concession 
on the part of the Union regarding market access and 
reductions in trade-distorting farm support, putting the 
EU ﬁrmly in the camp of foot-draggers in negotiations 
prior to the Hong Kong Ministerial. 
WTO member countries hoped that the framework 
for modalities and the Hong Kong Ministerial would 
provide  good  mechanisms  for  making  progress  on 
completing  agricultural  trade  negotiations  for  the 
Doha Round. A golf analogy describes the disappoint-
ing results. The framework for modalities provided a 
good drive that placed the ball in the middle of the fair-
way. Negotiators then were in a position to use a long 
iron to put the ball on the green and ﬁnish at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial with one or two putts to salvage a 
par or bogey on the hole. It turns out that all that was 
done prior to and during the Hong Kong Ministerial 
was to dribble the ball a few yards down the fairway 
in the general direction of the green. This result was 
reﬂected in comments by WTO Director General, Pas-
cal Lamy, who said that as a result of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial meetings, the Doha Round was 60 percent 
completed, as compared to 55 percent completed prior 
to the Ministerial meetings [10, p. 1]. 
Pascal  Lamy  gave  member  countries  an  April 
30, 2006 deadline for completing full modalities for 
agriculture. He called for WTO member countries to 
meet this deadline for establishing the formulas and 
rules for implementing reforms in agriculture, focus-
ing on speciﬁc formulas, depth of tariff and subsidy 
cuts, phase-in periods and other rules. If the April 30, 
2006 deadline had been met, it would have contributed 
importantly to the overall goal of ﬁnishing all Doha 
Round negotiations by the end of 2006. Many WTO 
members doubted whether the April 30 and the end 
of 2006 deadlines would be met [10].  Their doubts 
regarding the April 30 deadline proved to be accurate 
since that deadline passed without completion of the 
full modalities for agriculture.
Why All the Fuss About Completing the  
Doha Round Negotiations in 2006? 
The end of 2006 target date is important because of 
U.S. political considerations. President Bushʼs Trade 
Promotion Authority (fast-track negotiating authority) 
expires on July 1, 2007. Fast track negotiating author-
ity requires the U.S. Congress to give an up or down 
vote on a trade agreement—it cannot tinker with spe-
ciﬁc provisions of the agreement. It will be important 
for fast track negotiating authority to be in place during 
the entire Doha Round because other countries would 
be unwilling to negotiate an agreement with the U.S. 
if the Congress could modify the provisions in pos-
sibly unacceptable ways. Moreover, in the run-up to 
the 2008 Congressional and Presidential elections, it is 
questionable whether the U.S. Congress will renew the 
Presidentʼs fast track negotiating authority. Hence, it 
is necessary to complete the Doha Round negotiations 
by the end of 2006 or soon thereafter.
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What was Accomplished at the  
Hong Kong Ministerial Meetings?
WTO negotiators recorded one signiﬁcant accom-
plishment at the December 2005 Hong Kong Minis-
terial that has relevance for the U.S. and world dairy 
industries. This was an agreement to end agricultural 
export subsidies by 2013; a substantial concession on 
the part of the EU, by far the largest user of export 
subsidies. Speciﬁcally, about 88 percent of all export 
subsidies used by all WTO member countries originate 
in the EU [8, p. 16]. The U.S. currently accounts for 
about 1.8 percent of all WTO agricultural export sub-
sidies. This difference translates into a huge edge in 
allowable export subsidies for the EU for certain prod-
ucts. For example, the EU has authorization under the 
Uruguay Round WTO agreement to export with sub-
sidy about 100 times more cheese annually than the 
U.S. 
While the U.S. is not a big user of export subsi-
dies, agreeing to end export subsidies has noteworthy 
impacts on the U.S. For example, to comply with any 
Doha Round agreement, the USDA would be required 
to end use of export subsidies under the Dairy Export 
Incentive Program (DEIP). The end of the DEIP poten-
tially has its greatest impact on U.S. nonfat dry milk 
(NDM) exports. This is important because the U.S. 
may again ﬁnd itself unable to export NDM at world 
prices. As noted in Table 5, the equivalent of over nine 
percent of 2005 U.S. production of NDM could be 
exported with subsidy under the provisions of the Uru-
guay Round WTO agreement. 
The Doha Round on export subsidies will have real 
teeth  for  dairy  industries  partly  because  substantial 
progress was made in deﬁning exactly what constitutes 
a dairy export subsidy. Much of the progress came as a 
result of the U.S.-New Zealand challenge to Canadaʼs 
dairy export subsidy programs under the WTO dur-
ing the late 1990s and early 2000s. This progress will 
prevent disguised dairy export subsidy programs from 
emerging to replace those outlawed under the Doha 
Round. It also will help to identify acceptable levels of 
dairy export subsidies during the phase-out period. 
As a result of the Doha Round agreement to end agri-
cultural export subsidies, the U.S. will be required to 
see that lending practices used under GSM 102 (short-
term export credit assistance) and GSM-103 (interme-
diate-term export credit guarantees) do not represent 
export subsidies. In particular, speciﬁc disciplines on 
export credit programs will be required to bring them 
into line with commercial lending practices, including 
a maximum repayment period of 180 days. 
The  elimination  of  export  subsidies  has  implica-
tions for food aid. The Doha Round will likely estab-
lish disciplines on food aid shipments to guard against 
commercial displacement while removing obstacles to 
emergency shipments and deliveries to countries with 
chronic food aid needs. 
It is important to recognize the limitations of the 
agreement to end agricultural export subsidies. Andrew 
Stoler, Executive Director of the Institute for Interna-
tional  Business,  Economics  and  Law  at Australiaʼs 
University of Adelaide, puts this point as follows [10, 
p. 2]:
(The) agreement . . . to end export subsidies by 2013 
. . . has to be seen as a success from the meeting. 
However, the not so ﬁne print of the Declaration 
also tells us that this date sticks only to the extent 
that other parts of the negotiation move ahead suc-
cessfully on schedule. And this brings us back to the 
April 30 target for agreement on modalities. Can 
this target be met?
What are the Major Sticking Points to 
Successfully Concluding Agricultural 
Negotiations for the Doha Round?
Stoler argues persuasively that the Doha Round is a 
market access round for agriculture [10]. He indicates 
that experience in the past 18 months of negotiations 
show that market access barriers are far more difﬁcult 
to  address  successfully  than  the  issues  of  domestic 
support and export competition. He adds that the Doha 
TABLE 5.    Maximum Annual Subsidized Dairy Exports 
for the United States Under the Uruguay Round 
WTO Agreement
  Maximum Subsidized   % of 2005  
Product  Exports (1,000 MT)  Production
Butter  21.1  3.5
NDM  68.2  9.2
Cheese  3.0  0.1
Sources: USDA [5,6].U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook, 2006
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Round is not a highly complex rule-making negotia-
tion like the Uruguay Round—there are no technical 
excuses, only a failure to deliver on market access. 
What is the basis for such a conclusion?
The relatively high tariff protection enjoyed by the 
agricultural  sectors  of  selected  countries  under  the 
Uruguay Round WTO agreement is indicated by Table 
6.  Countries  such  as  India,  Korea,  and  Japan  have 
used  high  tariff  protection  to  shield  their  relatively 
inefﬁcient farming sectors from foreign competition. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that such countries are 
reluctant to grant substantially greater market access 
for foreign agricultural products. 
The July 2004 framework for modalities describes 
what  has  turned  out  to  be  the  difﬁcult-to-achieve 
objective regarding expanded market access, as fol-
lows [12]: 
The  July  2004  Framework  calls  for  progressive 
tariff reductions delivering deeper cuts to higher 
tariffs. The Framework committed members to sub-
stantial improvements in market access for all prod-
ucts including sensitive ones, to be granted through 
a combination of tariff quota expansion and tariff 
reductions. The Framework establishes that devel-
oping countries will not be expected to cut tariffs as 
aggressively as developed economies.
Under the ﬁrst stage of the U.S. proposal (as speci-
ﬁed in October 2005) the following changes were sug-
gested to increase market access [12]:
•  Progressive tariff reduction: Developed 
countries would cut their tariffs by 55–90 
percent. Lowest tariffs would be cut by 55 
percent, with cuts ranging up to 90 percent for 
highest tariffs. 
•  Tariff rate caps: A “tariff cap” would be 
established to ensure that no tariff is higher than 
75 percent.
•  Sensitive products: Tariff lines subject to 
“sensitive product” treatment would be limited 
to one percent of total dutiable tariff lines. For 
sensitive lines, full compensation to trading 
partners would be ensured by expanding tariff 
rate quotas where they exist.
•  Special and differential treatment: Slightly 
lesser cuts and longer phase-in periods would be 
established for developing countries to deliver 
real improvements in access while ensuring that 
import-sensitive sectors in those countries are 
afforded appropriate protection.
Proposals advanced by the EU differ substantially 
from  the  U.S.  and  G-20  proposals,  as  noted  below 
[13]: 
•  The EU formula would deliver a 39 percent 
average reduction in EU tariffs, which is only a 
little more than the Uruguay Round average cut 
of 36 percent. 
•  The EU proposal (39 percent average cut with 
142 sensitive product tariff lines for the EU) 
differs from the U.S. proposal (which would 
deliver a 66 percent average cut of EU tariffs 
with 18 sensitive tariff product lines) and the 
G-20 proposal (which calls for a minimum 54 
percent average cut in tariffs for developed 
countries and 18 sensitive product tariff lines for 
the EU).
As noted below, the amount of increased market 
access provided by the EU proposals would be small 
for certain dairy products in highly protected markets 
[13]:
•  Japanʼs bound and applied tariff on whey and 
NDM is 30 percent. Under the EU proposal 
these tariffs could remain as high as 24 percent. 
Japanʼs bound and applied tariff on processed 
cheese is 40 percent. Under the EU proposal the 
tariff would be cut only to 22 percent. 
•  The EUʼs proposal would not reduce tariffs 
much for some of the Unionʼs top exports. The 
proposals would only reduce Japanʼs tariff on 
TABLE 6.  Current Average Bound WTO Tariffs
Country  Average Bound Agricultural Tariff (%)
U.S.  12
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block cheeses to 24 percent. Canadaʼs tariffs on 
block cheese would remain at 98 percent after 
applying the EU formula to Canadaʼs 246 percent 
tariff. The U.S. duty on blue-veined cheese 
would fall from 85 percent to 42.5 percent. 
The sensitive products formula proposed by the EU 
is effective for keeping closed markets impervious to 
import competition. This is partly because of the rela-
tively large number of sensitive products proposed and 
the way sensitive products are treated under tariff rate 
quotas (TRQ). Under the EU proposal, the amount of 
TRQ increase is dependent on the size of the current 
tariff and the level of current market access. Therefore, 
countries that currently protect their markets with high 
tariffs and small TRQs are rewarded because their low 
level of imports translates into a smaller TRQ for the 
sensitive product. Examples for dairy products suggest 
how the EU proposal would work for sensitive prod-
ucts [13]:
•  EU butter: The proposed ad valorem equivalent 
(AVE) tariff on butter imported by the EU 
is 90 percent. Under the EU proposal, if the 
Union selects this product as sensitive, it could 
reduce the tariff by as little as 17 percent (to 75 
percent) and only compensate WTO members by 
providing an additional 15,000 tons of access. 
This is equal to less than 1 percent of annual EU 
consumption. 
•  Koreaʼs nonfat dry milk: The EUʼs proposed 
AVE tariff for Koreaʼs imports of NDM is 
176 percent. Under the EU proposal, if Korea 
designates this product as sensitive, the country 
could reduce the tariff by as little as 20 percent 
(to 141 percent) and compensate WTO members 
by providing only an additional 500 metric tons 
of access. This is less than 2 percent of total 
domestic consumption of NDM in Korea. 
There was little support at the Hong Kong Minis-
terial for ambitious market access increasing propos-
als such as those advocated by the U.S. [9]. Much 
ambiguity remains regarding what actually would be 
acceptable tariff reductions, although there apparently 
was support for using four bands to structure tariff 
cuts. Some member countries rejected completely the 
concept of a tariff cap. Other member countries sug-
gested higher limits than proposed by the U.S. for the 
cap. The concept of special tariff treatment for sensi-
tive products had general acceptance but the percent-
age of sensitive products ranges from one percent to 
15 percent of tariff lines. The notion that developing 
countries should be permitted to make smaller tariff 
cuts and to have more time to make the cuts appears to 
have substantial support.
There is little point in belaboring the arcane points 
relating to failure of WTO negotiators to deliver on 
market access. Moreover, the points noted above rep-
resent only a “snapshot” of the state of ongoing nego-
tiations when this paper was written in March of 2006. 
What is certain is that much remains to be negotiated 
if  meaningful  increases  in  market  access  are  to  be 
achieved. Indeed, only Herculean efforts by negotia-
tors strongly motivated to reach an agreement would 
have permitted an agreement to be reached on full 
modalities for market access for agriculture by April 
30, 2006. Such motivations were clearly lacking. 
What is the Status of WTO Negotiations on 
Trade-Distorting Domestic Support?
While  the  negotiations  regarding  trade-distorting 
domestic support may be less contentious than those 
for market access, big differences exist between the 
U.S. and EU proposals on this item.
Under  the  July  2004  framework  for  modalities, 
member countries agreed to substantially reduce trade-
distorting domestic support and to place caps on sup-
port  levels  for  speciﬁc  commodities.  Furthermore, 
members agreed to harmonization in the reductions 
so that countries with higher levels of subsidy will 
be subject to deeper cuts. In the ﬁrst year of imple-
mentation the overall level of trade-distorting domes-
tic support would be reduced, with an initial cut of 
20 percent. The framework also requires the blue box 
support (trade-distorting support currently linked to 
production limiting programs) be capped at 5 percent 
of a memberʼs total value of agricultural production. 
Further negotiations then would take place to ensure 
that blue box programs are less trade-distorting than 
amber box (most trade-distorting) programs. 
R.L. Thompson, a veteran agricultural trade analyst, 
provides speciﬁcs on what the July 2004 framework 
means for U.S. farm programs, as follows [11, p. 21]:U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook, 2006
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In the Framework Agreement the negotiators agreed 
that each high-income country should make a “sub-
stantial reduction in the overall level of its trade-
distorting  support  from  bound  levels,”  with  the 
highest levels of support being reduced the most. 
In the U.S. case this would entail more than pro-
portional reductions in commodity speciﬁc support 
for rice, cotton, sugar, dairy and peanuts (empha-
sis supplied). Product speciﬁc AMS caps on sup-
port would be imposed in addition to the binding on 
the aggregate support provided to the agricultural 
sector. The size of these caps and what is meant by 
“substantial reduction” remain to be deﬁned in the 
negotiations.
The U.S. proposal for the ﬁrst ﬁve years (as speci-
ﬁed in October 2005) contained the following provi-
sions [9,12]:
•  Amber box: Aggregate Measurement of Support 
(AMS) would be cut by 60 percent for the U.S., 
with product-speciﬁc AMS caps based on the 
1999–2001 period. 
•  Blue box: This source of support would be 
capped at 2.5 percent of the value of agricultural 
production.
•  De minimus: De minimus allowances for 
trade-distorting domestic support would be cut 
by 50 percent—from 5 percent of the value 
of production to 2.5 percent of the value of 
production for developed countries.
•  Overall cut: Overall levels of trade-distorting 
support would be reduced by 53 percent.
•  Harmonization: The allowable AMS for the EU 
and Japan would be cut by 83 percent. 
•  Green box: No substantial changes would be 
made in the criteria for green box payments 
and no cap would be established on green box 
support levels.
•  Litigation protection: A “peace clause” would 
be established to protect farm programs if a 
country keeps trade-distorting support below 
agreed upon levels. 
Where do current U.S. farm programs ﬁt in the var-
ious boxes? What are the limits to payments for the 
various boxes under the Uruguay Round WTO Agree-
ment? 
The  amber  box  (most  trade-distorting  support) 
includes the USDA dairy and sugar price support pro-
grams  and  marketing  loan  programs.  Current  U.S. 
amber box support under the Uruguay Round WTO 
agreement is limited to $19.1 billion per year. Certain 
non-product speciﬁc amber box payments, including 
crop insurance and previously used market loss assis-
tance payments met the de minimis test. 
Blue  box  payments  included  previous  deﬁciency 
payments and new counter-cyclical payments. Green 
box payments include conservation payments, disas-
ter payments, certain direct payments, and outlays for 
food assistance programs. 
Cuts proposed by the U.S. would mean substantial 
reductions in amber box payments from the allowed 
level of $19.1 billion under the Uruguay Round to 
$7.6 billion. AMS support for amber box programs in 
2005 was about $14 billion. Blue box and de minimis 
payments under the U.S. Doha Round proposal also 
would be modestly lower than recent annual payments 
for these spending categories. 
The EUʼs counter proposal submitted in response to 
the October 2005 proposal tabled by the U.S. would 
leave total EU AMS more than three times the amount 
of AMS for the U.S.—$26.7 billion vs. $7.6 billion 
for the U.S. [8, p. 20]. Negotiations at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial  meetings  appear  to  have  made  greater 
progress  toward  convergence  on  domestic  support 
than  was  the  case  for  market  access.  For  example, 
there was a working hypothesis regarding overall cuts 
by developed countries. The EU would be in line for 
the biggest overall cuts, the U.S. and Japan would be 
in the next largest category of cuts, and all other devel-
oped countries would fall in a third band. Developing 
countries would fall in a category requiring smaller or 
no cuts. There was also convergence on the notion that 
blue box payments should be constrained more than 
envisioned in the July 2004 framework for modalities. 
Other convergences involved more arcane detail than 
it is useful to report here. 
The large cut in AMS proposed by the U.S. likely 
would  have  signiﬁcant  effects  on  the  USDA  dairy 
price support program. This is because this program 
falls in the amber box and could account for a sub-
stantial amount of the $7.6 billion AMS that the U.S. 
would be allowed under its own proposal. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2006-1  17
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AMS computations involve comparing U.S. milk 
support price to a world price to obtain a measure of 
AMS. Under the Uruguay Round, charges of the dairy 
price support program against the AMS were calcu-
lated by multiplying total U.S. milk production by the 
difference between the farm milk price support level 
of $9.90 per hundred weight and a base period world 
market reference price for milk used for manufactur-
ing. The reference price is $7.25 per hundredweight, 
resulting in a $2.65 per hundredweight program cost. 
If AMS computations under the Doha Round are 
computed in approximately the same way as under the 
Uruguay Round, then there will be pressures to reduce 
the cost of the dairy price support program. In 2001, 
the last year for which reporting was made, the U.S. 
reported an AMS of $14.4 billion, $4.7 billion under 
the $19.1 billion cap. The dairy price support program 
contributed $4.5 billion to the total AMS. If the AMS 
for the dairy price support program under the Doha 
Round were to be roughly similar to the $4.5 billion 
ﬁgure, this would represent about 59 percent of the 
allowable $7.6 AMS total under the U.S. proposal. It is 
difﬁcult to estimate what product-speciﬁc AMS might 
apply to U.S. dairy programs under the Doha Round, 
hence the above analysis is incomplete. However, it is 
questionable whether any programs similar to the cur-
rent USDA dairy price support program could remain 
intact in view of the likely draw of the program against 
an AMS total as small as $7.6 billion. 
A number of U.S. farm state lawmakers have said 
that the 2007 Farm Bill will not be written by WTO 
trade negotiators, suggesting that outlays for the new 
Farm  Bill  will  not  be  limited  by AMS  constraints. 
However, there obviously will have to be some coordi-
nation of prospective outlays under the new Farm Bill 
with allowable AMS payments under any Doha Round 
WTO agreement. 
In Summary, Where Do Things Stand 
Regarding Agricultural Negotiations  
for the Doha Round WTO Agreement?
A massive amount of difﬁcult negotiations remain 
to be completed before the Doha Round agreements 
on agriculture can be ﬁnished. This situation creates 
the following possibilities: 
1. A Doha Round agreement is reached where 
meaningful reforms of agricultural and non-
agricultural trade are obtained. 
2. President Bush obtains an extension of fast 
track negotiating authority for additional months 
in 2007 and 2008 to allow additional time for 
completing the Doha Round negotiations.
3. A less than fully meaningful Doha Round 
Agreement is reached in order to satisfy the end 
of 2006 deadline.
4. Negotiations are not completed by the end of 
2006 and further WTO negotiations are delayed 
for several years until a new U.S. Administration 
again has fast track negotiating authority. 
Unfortunately,  the  third  and  fourth  possibilities 
appear more likely than the ﬁrst. Completing a mean-
ingful agreement by the end of 2006 will be difﬁcult 
partly  because  the  Doha  Round  negotiations  must 
satisfy not just the U.S. and EU but the Group of 20 
developing countries as well. In addition, many U.S. 
agricultural trade groups would prefer no agreement 
to a bad agreement of the type that might materialize 
under a hurry-up agreement. It is possible, of course, 
that President Bush could obtain an extension of fast 
track negotiating authority beyond the mid-2007 expi-
ration date. However, for this to happen it would be 
necessary for the Republicans to retain control of both 
houses of Congress in the 2006 elections and for the 
President to obtain the support of most of his party for 
the extension of fast track. These are not sure things. 
A  collapse  of  Doha  Round  negotiations  or  any 
lengthy  delay  in  those  negotiations  could  give  the 
U.S. and other trading partners incentives to push Free 
Trade Agreements  (FTAs)  or  regional  trade  agree-
ments.  The  U.S.  pursued  such  a  strategy  to  bring 
negotiators back to the bargaining table after the col-
lapse of the Cancun, Mexico Ministerial meetings in 
2003. This was an effective strategy for the U.S. then 
because certain WTO members had strong incentives 
to  resume WTO  negotiations  and  had  little  to  gain 
from FTAs or regional trade agreements. Moreover, 
the U.S. had potentially beneﬁcial FTAs or regional 
free trade agreements to pursue at the time.
This is currently not a fully viable strategy for the 
U.S. since it is not clear that the U.S. has much to gain 
from additional FTAs or regional trade agreements. U.S. Dairy Trade Situation and Outlook, 2006
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The  Free  Trade  Agreement  of  the  Americas—an 
ambitious trade agreement that could carry important 
beneﬁts for the U.S.—is stalled. The U.S. does have 
ongoing FTA negotiations with the United Arab Emir-
ates, the ﬁve nations of the Southern Africa Customs 
Union  (Botswana,  Lesotho,  Namibia,  South  Africa 
and Swaziland), Thailand, Panama, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, and Malaysia [3]. It may be possible for the Bush 
Administration to push these agreements through to 
completion, but none of them will bring about agricul-
tural trade reform comparable to that which would be 
obtainable under the Doha Round of the WTO. 
Nor  is  Congressional  approval  of  new  FTAs  or 
regional free trade agreements a “slam dunk” for the 
President.  Recall  that  the  Central America-Domini-
can Republic regional free trade agreement passed the 
House of Representatives by only a 217 to 215 vote 
and the Senate by a 55 to 45 vote in 2005. Thus, for 
many reasons, the U.S. has more to gain from securing 
a reasonable Doha Round agreement than from pursu-
ing additional FTAs or regional free trade agreements. 
A complication was tossed into the Doha Round 
negotiations in mid-April 2006 when President Bush 
tapped U.S. Trade Representative Robert Portman to 
be the new head of the Ofﬁce of Management and 
Budget. Portman was a “heavy hitter” who might have 
been instrumental in moving the Doha Round nego-
tiations along and securing approval of a Doha Round 
Agreement  in  the  U.S.  Congress.  Susan  Schwab,  a 
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, was nominated by 
President Bush to succeed Portman as U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative. Schwab is a capable negotiator but lacks 
Portmanʼs clout. Indeed, Portmanʼs departure from the 
position of U.S. Trade Representative could be seen as 
a vote of no conﬁdence on the part of the Bush Admin-
istration in the Doha Round negotiations.  
It is probably no overstatement to conclude that suc-
cessful completion of the Doha Round in 2006 or early 
2007 would show that meaningful multilateral negoti-
ations on agriculture are still possible under the WTO. 
Collapse of the negotiations would show the opposite. 
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